were entirely serious in their charges of U.S. aggression in connection with the Formosa action. While they did not wish to aid North Korea, they believed the U.S. was only using Korea as a pretext for building up Far East forces to assist the Chinese Nationalists. The Indian Ambassador urged that the situation might be eased if Russia returned to the Security Council and Communist China was also seated, and Bajpai supported this suggestion. Ambassador Henderson replied that he could not see that anything would be gained by the presence of the two States in the Security Council so long as they did not alter their attitude on the Korean case, but he promised to forward the Indian views to Washington.(Tel. 21) - TAB 1

2. 6:52 a.m. -- Asked by G-3 for a recommendation as to US reaction from the political-military viewpoint in the event that Chinese Communist combat forces should enter the Korea fighting, CINCFE said in a regular Department of the Army teleconference that in such event "sufficient power must be added to UN forces to insure fulfillment of currently assigned missions." "The first military steps," CINCFE said, "should be to destroy the communication facilities into and through North Korea. The assistance of SAC would be required for this task. An announcement by the President that the U.S. would back up the UN decision with the Strategic Air Force if necessary might be a psychological deterrent to the Chinese people, including those in the military forces." (Extracts from DA TT 3462 and 3467) - - - - - - - - - - TAB 2

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY _____ DATE 7/16/81
RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____
TS AUTH. REASON(S) _____
DECLASSIFIED
RELEASABLE
FA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

July 6, 1950 (Continued)

3. 10:04 a.m. -- Ambassador Douglas reported that the British Charge in Peiping had informed his Government of the view of one official of the Chinese Communist Government that the invasion of Formosa would now have to be abandoned. The British Charge held the opinion that the North Korean action came as a shocking surprise to the Chinese Communists. (Tel 86) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TAB 3

4. 10:15 a.m. -- At the Secretary's briefing for the NSC meeting in the afternoon, it was agreed that the Department should support a study by the NSC consultants of the problems involved in the blockade of Korea. To be considered would be such questions as instructions covering the possibility of contacts with Soviet vessels, the value of the blockade as such, international military liaison among the U.S., UK and other countries contributing naval forces, the possibility of UN supervision of the blockade, etc. -- In a memorandum by Mr. Johnson of NA, it was indicated that, besides the British, the Danish and Norwegian Embassies had informally asked for additional information and that similar inquiries from other countries were anticipated. (Memo on Secretary's NSC briefing; memo by Johnson) - - - - - - - - - TAB 4

5. 11:51 a.m. -- Embassy Moscow telegraphed the text of a Soviet note branding the U.S. blockade of the Korean coast "a new act of aggression" and indicating that the Soviet Government would hold the U.S. "responsible for all the consequences of this act and for the entire damage which may be caused to the interests of the Soviet Union." (Tel 50) - TAB 5

6. 12:30 p.m. -- The President, at the Secretary's regular meeting with him, approved the Department's draft of the proposed Security Council resolution for a unified command in Korea. (Memo by the Secretary) - TAB 6

July 6, 1950 (Continued)

7. 2:58 p.m. -- Ambassador Kirk reported that Gromyko had summoned the British Ambassador and asked whether he had any specific proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Korean dispute, adding that the USSR wished for such a settlement. The British Ambassador replied that his Government hoped that the Soviet would use its influence with the North Korean Government to stop the bloodshed, and on being pressed to be more specific, said Britain desired to return to the status quo in Korea. He said he would report Gromyko's remarks to his Government, and call again if he was given any communication for the Soviet Government. (Tel 54) -- The British Embassy in Washington also communicated to the Department the text of Ambassador Kelly's report, together with a request from the British Foreign Office to obtain Secretary Acheson's reaction. The Foreign Office said it would "not make any further move in Moscow without discussion with the United States Government." It observed that the British public "in the main believe that the Russians themselves recognize that they have overstepped the mark in Korea. They will therefore expect the most serious consideration to be given to any move which might lead to peace ..." (Extract from Foreign Office telegram to British Embassy, Washington with attached copies of Kelly reports of July 6 and June 29) - TAB 7

8. 3:44 p.m. -- Ambassador Kirk cabled that his first reaction to the Soviet request of the British for specific proposals was to regard the approach as genuine to the extent that it reflected the current Soviet view of Korean developments as unfavorable and their desire to localize the affair and to salvage as much prestige as possible. He said that Gromyko's request for specific proposals "cannot be let drop" and proposed a reply which would "make fully clear that a prerequisite to a peaceful solution is complete compliance by the North Koreans with the

the SC order that they withdraw behind the 38th parallel and cease fire." Kirk suggested that there might be added a request for assurances the Soviet Union would cooperate and participate in a subsequent UN supervised all-Korean election, if voted for by the other UN members, and that "inquiry might then be made whether the Soviet Government has anything specific in mind itself." (Tel 55) - TAB 8

9. 4:30 p.m. -- The Swedish Ambassador informed Mr. Matthews that he had told Secretary General Lie that Sweden would await UN action and some indication of what assistance would be useful before coming forward with any offer. The Ambassador said the Foreign Affairs Council had been unanimous in favor of the Swedish reply to the UN and asked whether Mr. Matthews had seen it. He further referred to the "unfortunate impression" caused by "the first 'silly' press report to the effect that Sweden would take no attitude in the matter." (Memo by Green) - TAB 9

10. 4:58 p.m. -- Ambassador Allen reported that Foreign Minister Kardelj had said Yugoslavia would seek an early appropriate occasion to "get off the fence" and make a declaration in support of the Senate Council resolution. Kardelj said recent troop movements in Bulgaria made the situation delicate but that an appropriate occasion might be found when the fighting returned to the 38th parallel if not before. Ambassador Allen told the Department that he had been strongly urging open Yugoslav support of our position in the UN, in the belief that the desirability of a clear Yugoslav position against aggression outweighed all the immediate advantages of a middle course. (Tel 22) TAB 10

11. 6:58 p.m. -- Ambassador Bay reported that he had communicated to Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange the Department's hope that Norway would introduce in the Security Council the next day the proposed resolution

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July 6, 1950 (Continued)

resolution for a unified command. Lange "appeared hesitant ... on grounds (1) that matter was more appropriate for larger powers, (2) that proposal in any case originated with larger powers and it therefore was more desirable for them to take the action indicated, and (3) that Norway had not participated in preliminary discussions leading to drafting of resolution." (Tel 22) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TAB 11

12. 9:33 p.m. -- Ambassador Austin telegraphed to the Department the text of a cablegram received by the UN from the Chinese Communist Government, which declared: "Despite any military steps of obstruction taken by the U.S. Government, the Chinese people are irrevocably determined to liberate Taiwan without fail." The message charged that the U.S. action regarding Formosa was "an act of open aggression" and that by remaining silent the Security Council and the Secretary General had "foregone their functions and duties of upholding world peace." The resolution of June 27 regarding Korea was declared to be illegal and greatly damaging to the UN charter. (Tel 25) - - - - - - - - - - - - TAB 12

Other Actions, July 6

(Listed here are entries for which no exact time is available.)

13. Brigadier General P. M. Hamilton of the U. S. Air Force showed Mr. Rusk a telegram from the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces to Headquarters Air Forces, Washington, asking for permission to conduct high level (30,000 feet) reconnaissance flights over Dairen, Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Karafuto, and the Kuril Islands. General Hamilton said that certain officers felt that FEAF should simply go ahead and conduct such reconnaissance without raising any questions, while others thought that political clearance would be required. Mr. Rusk told General Hamilton that "such an operation at this time would raise political questions of gravest importance, that such flights would be clearly

July 6, 1950 (Continued)

clearly contrary to the President's specific directives on the subject of Manchuria and Siberia, and that (he) could not under any circumstances give consent or clearance to such an operation." Mr. Rusk informed the top policy group in the Department of General Hamilton's visit, whereupon Mr. Matthews discussed the situation with Secretary of Air Finletter. Finletter, it was reported, took a serious view of the matter and promised to act at once. (Memo by Rusk) - TAB 13

14. Prime Minister Attlee, in a message to President Truman, proposed that representatives of Britain and the United States "should meet to consider what courses of action are most likely to be adopted by the Soviet Government and should have an exploratory discussion of the plans we should adopt to meet them." He suggested Lord Tedder on the British side, together with a representative of the UK Chiefs of Staff who would advise Lord Tedder on thinking in London. He also suggested that the Department of State be associated with these talks, in which event Lord Tedder also would be supplied with "appropriate political advice." (Message from Mr. Attlee to the President) - - TAB 14

15. Mr. Perkins suggested to the Secretary that he discuss with the British Ambassador the hardening of the U.S. attitude on Chinese Communist admission to the UN, our desire that British oil shipments to China be halted especially in view of the adverse publicity resulting from British gasoline being used to power North Korean tanks, the pleasure of this government over "the effective and prompt action of the principal members of the British Commonwealth in supporting UN resolutions on Korea and in sending military assistance," and our hope that the British would prohibit shipments of 1B List articles to China. (Memo from Perkins) - TAB 15

July 6, 1950 (Continued)

16. Mr. Matthews set forth procedure under which State-Defense liaison problems might be channeled through his office and that of General Burns, representing Defense. (Memo by Matthews) -- On this same problem of State-Defense liaison Mr. Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff proposed to the Under Secretary an executive order for a high Defense official to attend the regular high-level meetings of the Department of State and for a high State official to attend the JCS and other Defense meetings. Mr. Nitze said the benefits "would more than compensate for any awkwardness or embarrassment which might arise if difficulties of either Department with the other should be the subject of discussion." (Memo by Nitze) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TAB 16

17. Department of the Army dispatched to General MacArthur for his comments and those of Ambassador Muccio the draft agreed upon by State, Army, and ECA for an interim initial directive with respect to civil affairs activities in Korea. (See Log, July 5, Entry 19). One sentence was added by Army without State clearance. It provided that disagreements among U.S. agencies be referred to Washington, with CINCFE to act in the interim as the military situation might require. (Army Message 85117 to CINCFE) - TAB 17

18. The Deputy Director of MDA in a memorandum to Under Secretary Webb expressed the view that a Congressional investigation of "the whole background of the Korean situation" was probable and that an attempt would be made to blame the entire Korean crisis on the Administration and more particularly on the Department of State. He recommended preparing "a well-organized and well-documented case," and considering "the best means of presenting the correct facts to the public in an understandable fashion." (Memo Ohly for Webb) - - - - TAB 18

July 6, 1950 (Continued)

ANNEXES

(Background and Collateral Material)

A. Korea Bulletin (OIR 5299.6) - - - - - - - - - - - (TAB A)

B. Daily Intelligence Comment (DIC 131, Supplement No. 1) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (TAB B)

C. World Reaction to Korean Developments, No. 9 (OIR) - (TAB C)

D. Weekly Information Policy Guide, No. 14 (P/POL) - (TAB D)

T O P S E C R E T

Summary of Actions and Decisions - July 7, 1950

(All entries are in EDT; on incoming telegrams the time of receipt is used.)

1. 12:39 a.m. -- USUN reported a series of discussions held on July 6 with other delegations concerning the proposed resolution in the Security Council to set up a unified command. General support for the resolution was indicated, including that of the Latin American caucus. Signs that Yugoslavia and Egypt were coming around to support the line of action being followed were also reported. (Tel 28) - TAB 1

2. 10:00 a.m. -- At the Under Secretary's meeting, Mr. Webb said the Secretary had directed that regardless of possible temptations to the contrary, no officer of the State Department was to engage in any activity or make any statement tending to disrupt harmonious relations among Government Departments. -- The British desire to review the legal implications of the Korean blockade was discussed at the meeting. -- Mr. Hickerson reported that Senator McMahon had suggested a public threat to try North Korean leaders for war crimes. -- Mr. McGhee reported considerable sentiment in the Far West in favor of a renunciation by the U. S. of the Yalta Agreement on grounds its terms had already been broken by the Russians. (UM M-216) - TAB 2

3. 11:00 a.m. -- Dr. Tan, Chinese Minister, delivered an Aide-Memoire to Mr. Merchant concerning the military policy of the Chinese Nationalists. He emphasized orally those paragraphs which stated that the Chinese Nationalists felt they must carry on reconnaissance, and that they considered as of especial importance the maintenance of existing Nationalist positions on various off-shore Chinese islands. (Memo by Clubb) - TAB 3